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THE CIVIL REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS
Lesley E. Williams*
We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in
suits under § 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter mis-
conduct or to punish that which occurs.... [A] prosecutor stands
perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of
constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by
an association of his peers.'
INTRODUCTION
The availability of discipline by professional associations in cases of
prosecutorial misconduct encouraged the Supreme Court to grant
prosecutors absolute immunity for trial-related activities under § 1983.
For over twenty years, courts have invoked the reasoning in Imbler v.
Pachtman2 to bolster and justify the bestowal on prosecutors of broad
immunity from civil suit regardless of the alleged wantonness or reck-
lessness of prosecutorial behavior. Imbler assumes that prosecutors
are amenable to professional discipline.3 Imbler further assumes that
professional discipline will protect the public from prosecutorial
misconduct.4
Imbler's immunity doctrine rendered § 19835 and Bivens6 actions in-
effective in the regulation of prosecutors. Recognizing that it was re-
moving a consequential device from the regulatory arsenal, the Imbler
court proposed that the availability and efficacy of professional disci-
pline would offset prosecutors' immunity from those actions.'
Twenty-three years of case law after Im bler suggest that professional
disciplinary bodies do not sufficiently compensate for the broad grant
of immunity prosecutors receive from the courts against civil rights
actions.8 When prosecutors properly invoke immunity, judges dismiss
§ 1983 and Bivens actions.9 This obviates the need for judges to ana-
lyze the allegations of misconduct and resolve factual questions about
a prosecutor's conduct. Because professional disciplinary mechanisms
do not address the prosecutorial misconduct either, no public record
* I would like to thank Professor Bruce Green for his encouragement and
insight.
1. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) (citations omitted).
2. 424 U.S. 409.
3. See id at 429.
4. See id
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
6. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
7. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 429.
8. See infra Part IV.A-B.
9. See infra Part III.A-B.
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exists that could be used in the future by prosecutors as a barometer
of their conduct or a guide to appropriate behavior.' °
This Note examines the role of § 1983 and Bivens actions in the
regulation of prosecutors. Part I discusses the regulation of prosecu-
tors through statutory law and professional norms. Part II discusses
the regulation of prosecutors through the Constitution. Part III exam-
ines, through the filter of absolute and qualified immunity, the civil
liability prosecutors face for certain behavior. Part IV analyzes why
Imbler's premise is incorrect. Part V proposes several ways to fill the
void created by broad grants of immunity and the dearth of regulatory
follow-up. This Note concludes that, regardless of the method chosen
to address this void, the end must be the same: to provide prosecutors
with a barometer of acceptable behavior that details specifically what
should and should not be done in both the investigative and the advo-
cacy processes.
I. THE REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS GENERALLY
This part provides background on the regulation of prosecutors. It
explains the role positive law plays in this regulation, and examines
professional standards and enforcement of professional norms.
A. Positive Law
Prosecutors are regulated, in part, by statutory law. If prosecutors
engage in illegal conduct, such as the obstruction of justice," suborna-
tion of perjury,'2 or withholding of exculpatory evidence, 13 they may
be subject to criminal prosecution. For example, there is a case cur-
rently pending in Chicago against the "Du Page Seven."' 4 This case,
which is scheduled to go to trial imminently, stems from a forty-seven
count indictment of three former Du Page County prosecutors and
four Du Page sheriff's officers arising out of the prosecution of Ro-
lando Cruz for the 1983 murder and kidnapping of ten-year-old Je-
anine Nicarico.' 5 The seven men are charged, in pertinent part, with
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 (McKinney 1999) (obstructing governmen-
tal administration). In New York, a person is guilty of obstructing governmental ad-
ministration in the second degree when she "intentionally obstructs, impairs or
perverts the administration of law or other governmental function .... ." Id.
12. See, e.g., id. §§ 210.05, 210.10, 210.15 (perjury). The New York Penal Law
does not contain a crime separately defined as subornation of perjury, but according
to the doctrine of accomplice liability, see id. § 20.00, the person who suborns perjury
is guilty of the perjury committed by the person who was suborned. See id.
88 210.00-210.50 practice commentary, at 356.
13. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
14. See Ted Gregory, Du Page 7 Attorneys Seek Delay in Trial: Tribune Series
Cited as Adverse Publicity, Chi. Trib., Jan. 14, 1999, Metro Chi., at 1.
15. See id.
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conspiring to fabricate evidence against Cruz and concealing evidence
that may have exonerated him of the kidnapping, rape, and murder. 6
B. Professional Norms
Besides statutory law, prosecutors are also regulated by a variety of
standards of conduct promulgated by courts, the American Bar Asso-
ciation, internal regulators, and others. This section examines these
regulations and the methods of their enforcement.
1. Standards of Conduct
Prosecutors are regulated by professional norms. The foundation of
professional regulation for lawyers consists of the ethics codes
adopted by each state.17 State courts adopt ethics rules to govern law-
yers in their jurisdictions; the application of any state's rules is limited
by the jurisdiction of the state.' The rules state courts develop, how-
ever, are largely based on the American Bar Association's templates:
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility19 and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct"'
16. See id Cruz was finally acquitted of the charges in November 1995 during his
third trial. See id. By that time, he had been in prison for 12 years, 10 of which he
spent on death row. See id In dismissing the charges against Cruz, Judge Ronald
Mehling of Du Page County criticized the Cruz investigation. See id. His comments
led to the appointment of a special prosecutor and the grand jury probe of the case.
See id.
17. See Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers,
65 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 40-41 (1996).
18. See id.
19. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1981).
20. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1997). The ABA first codified eth-
ics rules in 1908 in the Canons of Professional Ethics. These were in effect for 62
years and functioned "not as a detailed guide to daily practice, but as an expression of
the general norms to which a lawyer should conform .... " Frank 0. Bowman, III, A
Bludgeon by Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical Rules" Against Prosecutors to
Control the Law of the State, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 665,761 (1996). In 1969, the ABA
supplanted the Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Model Code contains three tiers of norms: "Canons," which are short statements of
general principle; "Ethical Considerations," which are "should" rules and aspirational
in nature; and "disciplinary rules," which are "must" rules, imposing minimum stan-
dards of conduct. In 1977, the ABA attempted to replace the Code with the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which consists of 54 statute-like rules that describe
both prohibitions and conduct in which lawyers may engage in certain circumstances.
See Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998). ABA rules, however, have no bind-
ing legal effect unless they are adopted by a state's judiciary. Forty-two states have
based their ethics rules on the Model Rules. See Model Rules: Virginia Makes Nimer-
ous Changes in Adopting ABA Model Rules of Conduct, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 38 (Feb. 17, 1999). Other states follow the Model Code, or, like
California, have developed their own rules. See State Ethics Rules, Laws. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 01:3 (Aug. 20, 1997). There have been several occasions
when federal courts have intervened to nullify state bar regulations contrary to the
Constitution or federal statutes. See Bowman, supra, at 748 nn.419-20; see also, e.g.,
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 278 (1985) (striking down
residency requirements for bar membership and holding that the New Hampshire
1999] 3443
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As lawyers, prosecutors are subject to the same rules and regula-
tions that govern the conduct of lawyers generally.2 1 Prosecutors,
however, are not only lawyers, they are also "ministers of justice. '1 2
This epithet subjects prosecutors to additional rules, such as Model
Rule 3.8, which regulates a narrow range of conduct in which only
prosecutors engage.23 All jurisdictions have such a rule.24 Most have
adopted a version of Model Rule 3.8.25 As a minister of justice, the
prosecutor must not attempt to achieve her ends of justice through
unjust means.26
Prosecutors' conduct is also regulated by court rules.27 For exam-
ple, federal courts regulate the admission and conduct of lawyers who
Supreme Court's refusal to swear in a Vermont resident who passed the bar examina-
tion violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (holding that South Carolina's attempt to disci-
pline an ACLU attorney for improper solicitation of a client was a violation of First
and Fourteenth Amendments); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1957) (finding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment place limits on states' ability to exclude a person from the
practice of law for her admitted or suspected political beliefs).
21. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3.3, 3.4, 3.6 (governing
the general conduct of lawyers).
22. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). As Justice Sutherland
eloquently opined:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor.... But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id.
23. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8.
24. See Trial Conduct: Prosecutors, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
61:603 (Apr. 30, 1997).
25. Only one jurisdiction has adopted section "g," which was the ABA's 1994
amendment prohibiting extrajudicial statements likely to increase public condemna-
tion of the accused. See Trial Conduct: Prosecutors, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
61:601-06. Further, only several states have adopted section "f," which regulates pros-
ecutors' issuance of subpoenas to lawyers. See id.
26. See id. Prosecutors may also seek guidance in the ABA Standards Relating to
the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Prosecution Function ("Prosecution
Function") and the National District Attorney's Association: National Prosecution
Standards ("District Attorney Standards"). No jurisdiction has adopted either the
Prosecution Function or the District Attorney Standards in their entirety, see Bruce
A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev 69, 74 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Policing], but
courts often invoke them when they are interpreting law or formulating case-by-case
disciplinary rules. See id.
27. See id. at 75-76.
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practice in them.2s Although they do not apply a uniform set of pro-
fessional rules,2 9 most district courts have adopted either the rules
promulgated by the highest court of the state in which they sit or the
Model Rules.30 Some district courts also develop ethical rules on a
case-by-case basis.31 These types of rules, which are authorized by the
courts' supervisory powers,32 have been announced in judicial opin-
ions that criticize a prosecutor's conduct in a specific case.33 For ex-
ample, judges have ordered prosecutors to make disclosure to the
court and have set limits on a prosecutor's subpoena power.3 While
the court may be very clear that a prosecutor has transgressed a norm,
it rarely explicates the norm in its opinion, and even more rarely cre-
ates a standard for future use.35
Prosecutors are subject to internal regulations, which include office-
created procedure manuals such as the ten-volume Department of
Justice Manual for United States Attorneys ("DOJ Manual"). 6 The
DOJ Manual contains an entire section on ethical standards.37 DOJ
employees must report to their United States Attorney or other ap-
propriate supervisor any evidence or genuine allegation of misconduct
in violation of any law or applicable professional standard.38
The 105th Congress altered the regulatory stage with the Citizens
Protection Act of 1998,39 which subjects federal prosecutors and other
attorneys for the government to the same state laws, rules, and local
federal court rules as other attorneys in the state.40 The legislation
champions the long-standing views of the ABA and state ethics au-
thorities that federal prosecutors should be held to the same standards
28. See Bowman, supra note 20, at 750 & n.434. The Judicial Conference of the
United States writes the rules of procedure that govern lawyers in federal courts. See
Schneyer, supra note 17, at 40 n.37.
29. See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 Geo. Wash. L
Rev. 460, 463 (1996) [hereinafter Green, Whose Rules].
30. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 73.
31. See id. at 75-76.
32. For an examination of courts' supervisory power, see infra notes 45-52 and
accompanying text.
33. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 75.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Department of Justice Manual (1990).
37. See 28 C.F.R. § 45 (1998) (codifying DOJ's ethical standards).
38. 2 Department of Justice Manual § 1-4.100 (1995-1 Supp.).
39. 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1999). The Act is informally known as the
McDade Amendment because the original proposal was sponsored by Rep. Joseph
McDade (R-Pa.), who was acquitted in 1996 of federal conspiracy and racketeering
charges. See 14 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 498, 498 (Oct. 28, 1998).
According to one of McDade's aides, the Congressman sought the new law, not to
exact revenge for the lengthy, failed prosecution against him, but to ensure that the
DOJ could not exempt itself from the ethical rules and guidelines that govern all




that govern state prosecutors and other lawyers. 41 Although the text
of the Act does not discuss ethics rules or professional conduct, the
phrase "ethical standards" in the section's title suggests that the Act
refers to professional conduct rules, not all state laws. Some ethics
scholars have suggested that under the new law, state ethics rules may
function like rules of criminal procedure for federal prosecutors."
Thus, the private bar may have the potential to create more regula-
tions for federal prosecutors. 3 The Act was scheduled to take effect
in April 1999.44
2. Enforcement
Professional norms are enforced by state and federal courts, prose-
cutors' offices, and state disciplinary authorities. State and federal
courts may ensure prosecutors' adherence to professional norms
through the use of their contempt and supervisory powers.45 A judge
may hold a prosecutor in contempt when the prosecutor's behavior is
willfully disobedient or exhibits contemptuous or contumacious con-
duct in court that threatens the administration of justice. 6 In the past,
supervisory powers have allowed courts to dismiss criminal cases and
suppress evidence because of prejudice caused by a prosecutor's
misconduct.47
A number of recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the
scope of the use of supervisory powers to remedy prosecutorial indis-
cretion merely for violations of ethics rules.48 In Bank of Nova Scotia
v. United States,49 the Supreme Court held that a trial court may not
use its supervisory power as a means of remedying prosecutorial mis-
conduct before a grand jury unless the prosecutor's actions prejudiced
the defendant.5" The Court opined that courts may formulate proce-
dural rules not specifically articulated by itself or Congress.51 Courts
may not, however, invoke the supervisory powers if the exercise of
such powers would conflict with the Constitution or federal statutes. 52
41. See id.
42. See id. at 500.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 498.
45. See Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Mis-
conduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1083, 1089-90
(1994).
46. See United States v. Giovanelli, 897 F.2d 1227, 1230 (2d Cir. 1990).
47. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 80-83.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45-55 (1992) (holding that
courts have no authority to prescribe a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury).
49. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
50. See id. at 254.
51. See id. at 255.
52. See id.
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Professional norms may also be enforced through prosecutors' of-
fices' internal investigative procedures. For example, prosecutors in
U.S. Attorneys' Offices must report evidence and non-frivolous alle-
gations of serious misconduct that relate to the "exercise of [the] au-
thority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice ... to the Office
of Professional Responsibility ["OPR"] .... "5 OPR has jurisdiction
to investigate and mete out discipline to federal prosecutors.54
State disciplinary authorities, which are under the supervision of
state appellate courts, may also initiate disciplinary investigations of
prosecutorial wrongdoing.55 Additionally, they may prosecute and
sanction lawyers based on meritorious claims.56 All disciplinary com-
mittee determinations are subject to judicial review.' State discipli-
nary committee investigations occur in private.5" No public record of
the investigation is created unless the offending prosecutor is dis-
barred or sanctioned in some substantial way.59
Along with the significant number of statutory and ethical limita-
tions enumerated above, the Constitution also places limits on
prosecutorial conduct. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment play perhaps the most prominent role in
shaping prosecutors' actions in the criminal justice process. Part H
examines the parameters set by these constitutional guarantees.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS
Because prosecutors are agents of the government, they are also
regulated by the Constitution. This part examines the constitutional
provisions that most often pertain to prosecutors. This part presents
the amendments pertinent to prosecutorial function and discusses
remedies available for prosecutors' violations of constitutional
provisions.
A. Controlling Amendments
Prosecutors' actions are limited by numerous constitutional guaran-
tees. For instance, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments regulate the prosecutor's charging discretion.' Prose-
cutors have wide discretion in initiating prosecutions, but decisions to
prosecute may not be based on such considerations as race, religion,
53. 2 Department of Justice Manual § 1-4.100, at 1-193-94 (1995-1 Supp.).
54. See id.
55. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 88.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 3.4.4, at 107 (1986).
59. Public reprimand or suspension are two examples. See id. § 3.5.3. at 126-28.
60. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
1999] 3447
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or suppression of other constitutional rights.6 Defendants, however,
must clear high hurdles to prove a prosecutor's discriminatory intent.
The defendant must show that the prosecutor selected a particular
course of action "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.62 In addition, a defendant must
show current intent, not historical evidence, to prove a prosecutor ac-
ted with discriminatory purpose.63 A defendant pursuing a selective
prosecution claim must show that similarly situated persons are not
being prosecuted for the same offense. '
The guarantee of due process also prohibits a prosecutor from
choosing to proceed against a defendant for exercising a statutory or
constitutional right.65 Claims of pretrial vindictiveness are not often
successful because, in the pretrial context, a defendant must show "ac-
tual vindictiveness" on the part of the prosecutor.6
Further, the Due Process Clause regulates a prosecutor's decision
as to whether to disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused. Re-
gardless of good or bad faith, the non-disclosure by a prosecutor of
evidence favorable to the accused upon request "violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."'67
The duty of disclosure does not always depend on a defense request. 68
Undisclosed evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability
that the result would have been different had the evidence been re-
vealed.69 When determining the materiality of evidence, the court
questions whether the defendant received a fair trial without the evi-
dence, rather than whether the defendant would have been acquitted
had the undisclosed evidence been revealed.70
A prosecutor's actions are additionally limited by the defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights to a fair trial, protection against self-incrimi-
nation,7' and right to counsel, which guarantees the assistance of a
lawyer in the context of custodial interrogation.72 The prosecutor
must also abide by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which at-
61. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
62. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985).
63. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987).
64. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).
65. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974) (holding that a prosecutor
may not upgrade the defendant's charges after the defendant invokes the right to a
trial de novo).
66. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1982).
67. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
68. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976).
69. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1985).
70. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Due process guarantees also
prevent a prosecutor from coercing guilty pleas from defendants. See Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493
(1962).
71. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
72. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).
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taches when the proceeding reaches a critical stage at the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings.73
B. Remedies
Criminal defendants who believe that they have been deprived of
their constitutional rights have criminal procedural and civil substan-
tive remedies available to them.
1. Procedural
If a prosecutor's misconduct deprives a defendant of a constitu-
tional right, courts may grant a remedy to the defendant during the
criminal proceeding by suppressing evidence or dismissing the case.74
The harmless error doctrine, however, which precludes granting relief
unless the prosecutor's misconduct contributed to the conviction, has
reduced the availability of these procedural remedies."' Judges' au-
thority to remedy prosecutorial misconduct by granting relief to crimi-
nal defendants has also been narrowed by Supreme Court decisions
that restrict the scope of courts' supervisory power. Supervisory
power may not be invoked to reverse a defendant's conviction unless
the defendant was prejudiced by the conduct.76 The district courts
may not avoid the harmless error doctrine by invoking their supervi-
sory power.77
2. Civil
In addition to criminal procedural remedies, defendants who have
been deprived of their constitutional rights have civil remedies such as
§ 198378 and Bivens79 actions. This section discusses those remedies
and the limitations the courts and congress have placed on them, such
as absolute and qualified immunity.
73. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
74. See Morton, supra note 45, at 1089-90.
75. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,255-56 (1988); Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-79 (1986); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-18 (1982).
76. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507-09 (1983).
77. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1992); Bank of Nova Scotia,
487 U.S. at 255-56.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). After the Civil War, acts of terrorism were perpe-
trated by the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilante groups against blacks and Union sym-
pathizers. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction 1863-1877: America's Unfinished
Revolution 119-23, 425-59 (1988). Although almost all these acts were violations of
state law, local officials rarely intervened and sometimes overtly supported the lawless
behavior. See id. To remedy the situation, Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871. See id. Section 1 of the Act is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
79. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
1999] 3449
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a. Causes of Action
Because prosecutors are agents of the government, there is a rem-
edy for any action prosecutors take that deprives a person of her con-
stitutional rights. For state and local prosecutors, this remedy can be
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.80 For federal prosecutors, the remedy is a
Bivens action.8' The elements and defenses of these causes of action
in the context of deprivations of constitutional rights, however, are
sufficiently analogous to be treated the same in this Note.
Section 1983 grants a cause of action against any person who, under
color of state law, violates a person's rights under a federal statute or
the Constitution.82 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals alleging prosecutorial misconduct may also file
state common law claims for malicious prosecution. State claims for malicious prose-
cution are routinely dismissed for failure to state a claim because of the immunities
available to prosecutors at common law.
81. In Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action
parallel to that of § 1983 against federal officials who, while acting under the color of
federal law, violate a person's constitutional rights. See Megan M. Rose, Note, The
Endurance of Prosecutorial Immunity: How the Federal Courts Vitiated Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 1019, 1021 (1996). Actions brought against federal em-
ployees to remedy violations of federal law have become known as Bivens actions. In
Bivens, six federal agents allegedly violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90. The
Supreme Court has been very reluctant to expand Bivens to new contexts. See
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988) (holding that a Bivens action is un-
available for alleged violations of due process by government officials who adminis-
tered the Federal Social Security program); see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368
(1983) (refusing to create a Bivens remedy for a First Amendment violation when a
federal employee was demoted for making public statements critical of the agency in
which he worked); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (holding that a Biv-
ens action was unavailable for enlisted military personnel who were allegedly injured
by the unconstitutional actions of their superior officers). But see Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (recognizing a Bivens action against federal prison employees);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (recognizing a Bivens cause of action
under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for a congressional employee who
alleged sexual discrimination). To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must show
that a person acting under the color of federal law deprived her of a federally pro-
tected constitutional right. See Rose, supra, at 1021.
82. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 actions can be brought in state and federal courts.
Though it was passed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the statute lay un-
used until Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which plaintiffs sued local police
officers under § 1983 for unlawful search and arrest. See id. at 168-69. The Supreme
Court upheld the complaint. See id. Plaintiffs alleged that 13 police officers broke
into their home without search or arrest warrants and ransacked every room while
plaintiffs stood naked nearby. See id. Monroe was held for 10 hours in the police
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show that a person acting under the color of state law deprived her of
a federally protected constitutional or statutory right.Y3 Section 1983
does not provide substantive rights itself,' but provides a federal rem-
edy for the violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights.8s
The underlying substantive claim provides the intent component of
the § 1983 claim.86 For example, a plaintiff may file a § 1983 claim
against a prosecutor for violating her due process rights. If the plain-
tiff is unable to establish the elements of the underlying constitutional
or statutory violation, the § 1983 claim will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 7 The phrase "under
the color of state law" has been interpreted by the courts to apply to
public officials acting within their authority ss public officials acting in
abuse of authority granted to them the state, 9 and private individuals
whose conduct might be fairly attributable to the state.90 Prosecutors
are clearly state actors for the purposes of § 1983.91 Section 1983 pro-
vides damages and injunctive relief for private plaintiffs. 92
The plaintiff in a § 1983 or Bivens action may file a civil suit directly
against the state or federal official and seek compensatory and puni-
tive damages against that official in her personal capacity.93 A plain-
tiff who charges prosecutorial misconduct relating to a wrongful
conviction must also establish that the prior criminal proceeding
ended in her favor.94
station without being arraigned or permitted to call his family or attorney. See id.
Monroe was released without charges being filed. See id.
83. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 168-69.
84. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 (1980).
85. See id. at 4 (holding that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of
constitutional as well as federal statutory law).
86. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).
87. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (holding that to demon-
strate a constitutional violation arising from prison officials' alleged withholding of a
prisoner's medical care, the prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs).
88. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184.
89. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988).
90. This is a complicated question of fact and law. The Supreme Court has devel-
oped several tests to determine when private parties may be considered state actors
for the purposes of § 1983. See, eg., West, 487 U.S. at 54 (delegation test); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 931 (1982) (joint participation test); Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972) (nexus test); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150-61 (1970) (state compulsion test and joint participation test); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (symbiotic relationship test);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (public function test).
91. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).
92. See 1A Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims
and Defenses 2 (3d ed. 1997).
93. See id. at 478.
94. See Rose, supra note 81, at 1022-23. For example, the plaintiff must prove that
the conviction or sentence has been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by execu-
tive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or been the subject of a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 1023.
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b. Defenses to § 1983 and Bivens Actions
This section discusses the limitations courts and Congress have
placed on § 1983 and Bivens actions. Section 1983 and Bivens claims
may be defeated by one or more immunities. 95 Absolute immunity
protects prosecutors in their individual capacities from civil liability in
all § 1983 and Bivens claims that involve a prosecutor's role as advo-
cate for the state.96 Further, qualified immunity shields a prosecutor's
investigative and administrative actions from these claims. 97 Absolute
and qualified immunity pertain to claims for monetary relief against
officials in their personal capacities. 98 Absolute and qualified immu-
nity, however, do not extend to injunctive or declaratory relief.99
Although the broad language of § 1983 does not refer to any excep-
tions or immunities, the Supreme Court, in Tenney v. Brandhove,"'0
held that this silence meant that Congress intended the individual im-
munities available at common law at the time § 1983 was enacted to
95. The Eleventh Amendment prevents individuals from suing states. Under Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), neither states nor state officials in their official
capacities may be named as defendants under § 1983. See id. at 150. Plaintiffs must
name state officials in their individual capacities to avoid Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. The concept of state action embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is much
narrower than the color of law requirement of § 1983 or the state action principle of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, as long as public officials are named in their indi-
vidual capacities, they can be found to have been acting under the color of state law
without triggering the Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Price v. Akaka, 915 F.2d
469, 473 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to municipalities, counties, or other lo-
calities. A plaintiff may name a municipality as a defendant of a § 1983 claim, but
pursuant to the doctrine of municipal liability set out in Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality cannot be held liable under a respon-
deat superior theory for § 1983 claims caused by a municipal official. See id. at 993-94.
To maintain a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that the municipality
had a policy or custom made by a final policy maker that actually and proximately
caused the injury. See id. at 694. The question of who is a final policy maker is a
question of state law and should be resolved as a matter of law by the judge. See Jett
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
Under the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States cannot be
sued without its consent. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940). Sov-
ereign immunity is derived from the concept in English law that the king could do no
wrong. See Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2009, 2009 (1998) (cit-
ing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 238 (1765)). The
United States could not be sued in tort until Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)), in 1948. The federal
government retains immunity as a sovereign from certain enumerated intentional
torts, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with
contract rights. See id. § 2680(h).
96. See infra Part III.A.
97. See infra Part III.B.
98. See 1B Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 92, at 202.
99. See id.
100. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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be imputed to the statute.10' Courts have held that the immunities
available to public officials under § 1983 are also available in Bivens
actions.10o
i. Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity1 3 precludes suit absolutely, even if the offend-
ing official knew that her conduct was unlawful, malicious, or other-
wise without justification.1 4 Absolute immunity completely insulates
the official from civil liability.0 5 Absolute immunity is an immunity
from suit rather than a defense to liability.101 Defending officials may
appeal a district court's denial of absolute immunity immediately, as
long as the immunity issue may be resolved as a matter of law."07 Ab-
solute immunity is granted by the courts only when it is in the public
interest to protect a public official's smooth job function from the in-
terference that would be caused if the official had to defend a civil
lawsuit.0 8 The Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity to
legislators,' ° 9 judges," 0 the President,"' and prosecutors." 2  Suits
against officials entitled to absolute immunity are generally dismissed
on pretrial motions." 3 The defendant has the burden of establishing
absolute immunity." 4
101. See id. at 376; Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The
Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to its Absolute Means, 59
Alb. L. Rev. 1135, 1138 (1996). Tenney involved immunity for state legislators, which
was granted to federal legislators in the Constitution and by English and American
common law to prevent nuisance suits from hindering the law-making process. Id. at
1139. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Court held that the common-law
absolute immunity available to judges for "acts committed within their judicial juris-
diction" was preserved under § 1983. See id. at 554.
102. See e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17 n.8 (D.C. Cir 1977); Rose, supra
note 81, at 1023.
103. The Supreme Court applies absolute immunity only when justified by public
policy. There is a presumption that qualified immunity is sufficient to protect govern-
ment actors in their official acts. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991).
104. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
105. See 1B Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 92, at 207-08.
106. See id.
107. See id
108. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-26.
109. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
405 (1979) (regional legislators); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972)
(federal legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (state legislators).
110. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
111. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
112. See 1B Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 92, at 204.





Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense ordinarily available to
public officials who are sued under § 1983.11 Like absolute immunity,
qualified immunity is theoretically an immunity from suit, but in prac-
tice operates more like a standard of culpability." 6 Qualified immu-
nity does not immediately defeat a suit, but instead creates an
objective standard against which the defendant's actions will be mea-
sured.' 17 To succeed, the § 1983 or Bivens defendant must show that
she did not violate "clearly established statutory and constitutional
rights of which a reasonable official would have known."118 The con-
tours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable prosecu-
tor would understand that what she was doing would violate that right
in the circumstances in which she was acting. 1 9 If a prosecutor's ac-
tions do violate clearly established rights, qualified immunity will not
protect the prosecutor from civil liability.'2 0 Qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense, which must be raised and proved by the defend-
ant.1 21 Failure to plead qualified immunity in the answer is a waiver of
qualified immunity.' 22
Because of absolute and qualified immunities, prosecutors may po-
tentially engage in a wide variety of egregious conduct without facing
civil liability. As discussed below in part III, courts are bound to up-
hold the immunities regardless of how deplorable the prosecutors' al-
leged actions were.
Ill. THE CIVIL LIABILITY PROSECUTORS FACE AFrER IMBLER,
BURNS, AND BUCKLEY
This part explores the grant of absolute immunity to prosecutors'
advocacy functions and qualified immunity to investigative functions.
This part also discusses how the application of these immunities to
specific prosecutorial behavior operates to shield prosecutors from
virtually all civil liability under § 1983 and Bivens.
115. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1995).
116. See 1B Schwartz & Kirklin, supra note 92, at 336-37.
117. See Rose, supra note 81, at 1023-24.
118. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
119. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
120. See id.
121. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
122. See, e.g., Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537, 1548 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that county police officers, who failed to raise the issue of qualified immunity
before the district court in a § 1983 action, failed to preserve qualified immunity for
appeal); Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that the fail-
ure to plead qualified immunity may result in a waiver of the defense); Kelson v. City
of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 657 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d
1193, 1201 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
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A. The Broad Grant of Absolute Immunity to Protect
Prosecutorial Function
Imbler v. Pachtmnan'2 was the first case in which the Supreme Court
decided a question of immunity for prosecutors under § 1983. Imbler
created a broad rule of absolute immunity. 2 4 According to the Court,
absolute immunity should be granted to a prosecutor for activities "in-
timately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."2 5
The Court did not delineate the precise boundaries of the "judicial
phase," but explained that it was any action the prosecutor might un-
dertake in her role as advocate for the state. 26 The Court reserved
judgment on the immunity that should apply to a prosecutor's admin-
istrative or investigative actions.127 The Court interpreted Tenney's
holding that § 1983 existed in harmony with general principles of com-
mon law tort immunities and defenses to mean that prosecutors
should have immunity for all trial-related conduct." The only abso-
lute immunities available to prosecutors at common law, however,
were those for malicious prosecution and defamation.129 Imbler ex-
panded the category of prosecutorial misconduct covered by absolute
immunity.130
The Court presented several justifications for its preservation of ab-
solute immunity. First, the court reasoned, if prosecutors could be
sued, they would not be able to expend their full attention and energy
to their public duties as ministers of justice.131 Second, suits that sur-
vived pleadings would bestow on the prosecutor the enormous burden
of proving "good faith," often for acts done in the distant past.1'
Third, fear of liability would stop prosecutors from trying cases to the
utmost of their abilities. 33 The Court also addressed the lack of re-
dress available to truly wronged plaintiffs due to prosecutorial immu-
nity for § 1983 actions. The Court concluded that the value of
prosecutorial freedom outweighed the rights of the persons they in-
jured.134 It reasoned that there were other avenues through which
123. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
124. See id at 431.
125. See id. at 430.
126. See id at 431 & n.33.
127. See id. at 431 n.33.
128. See id at 418.
129. See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485 (1991); Rose, supra note 81, at 1025-26.
The Supreme Court of Indiana was one of the first American courts to award a prose-
cutor absolute immunity from civil suit. See Griffith v. Slinkard 44 N.E. 1001, 1002
(Ind. 1896). The United States Supreme Court first held a prosecutor absolutely im-
mune from civil actions for malicious prosecution in 1927. See Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S.
503 (1927) (per curiam), affg 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926).
130. See supra note 129.
131. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976).
132. See id. at 425-26.
133. See id. at 426 & nn.23-24.
134. See id. at 428.
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prosecutorial misconduct could be addressed, such as professional
discipline.' 35
B. The Application of Qualified Immunity to Investigative Function
Fifteen years after Imbler, the Court refined its approach to
prosecutorial immunity. In Burns v. Reed, 36 the Court focused on the
nature of the act, not the job title held by the actor.' 37 The Court
addressed whether immunity was applicable to two different scena-
rios: (1) a prosecutor's participation in a probable cause hearing that
led to the issuance of a search warrant, and (2) a prosecutor's giving
legal advice to the police regarding the use of hypnosis and the exist-
ence of probable cause.138 In regard to the first issue, the Court found
that because the probable cause hearing was "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process," the prosecutor should
be entitled to absolute immunity for any conduct therein. 39 As to the
second issue, the Court held that advising the police in the investiga-
tive phase of a criminal case was an investigative function and thus
entitled to qualified immunity only.140 The Court further explained
that common law did not provide absolute immunity for advising the
police. 141
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons142 further developed the functional test. In
Buckley, the Court reiterated that prosecutors should receive absolute
immunity for acts done in preparation for or during a judicial proceed-
ing.14 3 The Court, distinguishing these adversarial acts from those
that were investigative or administrative, held that prosecutors should
receive only qualified immunity for investigative or administrative
functions.'" The Court was closely divided on how to classify specific
behavior: five justices agreed that the prosecutor's acquisition of ex-
pert witness testimony was an investigative function. 145 The majority
of the Court concluded that a prosecutor should not consider herself
to be an advocate before she has probable cause to arrest anyone.1 46
135. See id. at 429.
136. 500 U.S. 478 (1991). In Burns, the Court opined that "qualified rather than
absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their
duties" and that the Court had been "quite sparing" in its recognition of absolute
immunity. Id. at 486-87. The Court reasoned that its role was not "to make a free-
wheeling policy choice, but rather to discern Congress' likely intent in enacting
§ 1983." Id. at 494.
137. See id. at 495-56.
138. See id. at 487.
139. Id. at 493.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
143. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
144. See id. at 273.
145. See McNamara, supra note 101, at 1151.
146. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
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Because of the holdings in Inibler, Burns, and Buckley, judges face
an unwieldy task, namely, to label a prosecutor's function. "7
Although Buckley purports to create a "bright-line test,"1 48 courts'
holdings vary widely in their assignment of function. 49 The Supreme
Court indicated that probable cause was the dividing line between in-
vestigative and advocacy functions.150 Before probable cause exists, a
prosecutor functions as an investigator; after probable cause exists, a
prosecutor functions as an advocate. The existence of probable cause,
however, is not always demarcated so clearly.
C. Examples
Since Imbler, courts have awarded immunity to prosecutors for a
range of behavior for which ordinary citizens and other state actors
suffer civil and criminal reproach. In applying broad grants of
prosecutorial immunity, courts reason that the defense of civil lawsuits
would divert prosecutors from their duty to fearlessly enforce the
criminal law and weaken the ultimate fairness of the criminal justice
system.' 5 ' Cases in which prosecutors receive immunity for alleged
misconduct that would otherwise violate an individual's civil rights re-
flect the message delivered by the Supreme Court in Imbler. in a bal-
ance between the smooth functioning of the justice process and one
individual's civil rights, the interests of the prosecutor and the public
outweigh the vindication of her civil rights.' As the Court an-
nounced in Imbler, "[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."'5 3
1. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct that Receives
Absolute Immunity
Prosecutors have received absolute immunity for alleged miscon-
duct in a great number of areas. For example, some courts have
granted prosecutors absolute immunity for alleged post-trial miscon-
duct. In Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz,154 the plaintiff, who had
been arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for a murder he did not
147. See infra Part III.C.
148. The Court explained that a prosecutor's actions were advocacy functions only
after the existence of probable cause. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
149. See McNamara, supra note 101, at 1160.
150. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
151. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 427 (1976).
152. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428. The state of mind of the prosecutor is irrelevant.
Immunity applies regardless of whether the prosecutor's behavior is in good faith,
negligent, reckless, wanton, or malicious. See id. at 427.
153. ld. at 428 (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).




commit, sued the prosecutors because they failed to take action to
overturn his murder conviction after new evidence surfaced that indi-
cated that he was innocent. 155 The court held that post-trial dismissal
decisions fit within the same tradition of immunity as charging deci-
sions and, therefore, are also entitled to absolute immunity. 56 If they
were not, the court reasoned, a § 1983 plaintiff could simply reword a
complaint for malicious prosecution, which is covered by absolute im-
munity, as a complaint for failure to dismiss.157 As the court ob-
served, "Even if it were shown that the defendants reviewed the
evidence, found [the person] innocent, and did nothing, their decision
withal [sic] not to dismiss his criminal case lies at the heart of the
prosecutorial function.' '1 58
Prosecutors receive absolute immunity for failing to disclose excul-
patory evidence.159 After being retried and acquitted of a crime for
which he had spent almost four years in jail, the plaintiff in Carter v.
Burch161 filed a § 1983 suit against a Virginia prosecutor for failing to
disclose statements by the alleged victim that suggested that the victim
had framed the plaintiff.' 6' The court held that failing to disclose the
evidence-whether such failure occurred before, during, or after
trial-constituted an advocacy function and, thus, was entitled to ab-
solute immunity.'62
Courts have also granted absolute immunity to prosecutors who al-
legedly fabricate and present false evidence to the grand jury.' 63 In
Hill v. City of New York,"6 the plaintiff sued a New York Assistant
District Attorney under § 1983 for violations of her Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. 165 The gravamen of her complaint was that
155. See Guzman-Rivera, 55 F.3d at 31. The evidence consisted of interviews with
three of the real murder's co-conspirators who unanimously stated Guzman-Rivera
was innocent. See id. at 28.
156. See id. at 31.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1994); Casey-El v. Hazel, 863
F.2d 29, 29-30 (8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir. 1986).
160. 34 F.3d 257.
161. See id. at 259-60.
162. See id. at 262.
163. See, e.g., Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that
absolute immunity insulated the prosecutor for allegedly manipulating and concealing
evidence before the grand jury); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that a prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for misstate-
ments); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that a prosecutor
was protected by absolute immunity in the grand jury context); see also Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 n.6 (1991) (dictum). The Supreme Court has made clear,
however, that fabrication of evidence must occur after the existence of probable
cause, that is, after the prosecutor has made a decision to indict, for it to be consid-
ered an advocacy function and thus covered by absolute immunity. See Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
164. 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995).
165. See id. at 659.
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the prosecutor fabricated evidence, presented the fabricated evidence
to the grand jury, and failed to inform the grand jury that exculpatory
evidence existed.166 While investigating a child abuse claim, the pros-
ecutor had coerced a child to implicate his mother in a videotaped
interview, although the child consistently had implicated his foster
brother in a prior videotaped interview with the prosecutor. 167 With-
out informing the grand jury that exculpatory evidence existed, the
prosecutor presented only the second videotape to seek the
indictment.16
8
The Second Circuit held that absolute immunity barred the plain-
tiff s claims that the prosecutor presented and conspired to present
false evidence to the grand jury.' 69 Absolute immunity also protected
the prosecutor's failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.170 The court expressed its disgust that it was bound by precedent
to grant the prosecutor's behavior immunity.' 71 The court found in-
sufficient information to determine if the prosecutor was entitled to
absolute immunity from the fabrication of evidence claim, because it
was unclear if the prosecutor obtained the video in which the boy im-
plicated his mother in an investigative or advocacy role. 172
Courts have granted absolute immunity to prosecutors who present
false evidence at trial. The prosecutor in Spurlock v. Whitley 73 alleg-
edly assured a witness of his release from jail in exchange for falsely
implicating the plaintiff in a homicide. 7 The witness first said he
merely saw the plaintiff with blood on his shirt the night of the mur-
der.Y75 The prosecutor allegedly influenced the witness to say that he
actually had seen the killing by promising the witness reward
money.' 76 The prosecutor allegedly presented this false testimony at
trial and encouraged a police officer to make false statements during
166. See i at 656-58.
167. See id.
168. See hi at 658. Hill was unable to post bail. See id. She remained incarcerated
for almost eight months. See id. During this time, her children were placed in foster
care. See id at 657. Hill gave birth to another child while shackled to a hospital bed.
See id. This infant was also taken from her care and placed in a foster home. See id.
The prosecutor filed two statements with the New York courts, claiming that no excul-
patory material existed. See id. at 658. Hill found out about the first tape when the
prosecutor responded to a request for the tape used in the grand jury by accidentally
sending the first tape to Hill's lawyer. See id. The indictment was ultimately dismissed
on December 18, 1991, over 10 months after Hill first discovered that her son had
been abused at his foster home. See id.
169. See id at 661-62.
170. See id
171. See id. at 656.
172. See id. at 663.
173. 971 F. Supp. 1166 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).





trial to bolster the credibility of the witness. 177 Spurlock filed a § 1983
suit against a prosecutor based on violations of his First, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 178 The prosecutor received absolute
immunity both for presenting false evidence at trial and conspiring to
do so. 179
Absolute immunity protects prosecutors who try to influence wit-
ness testimony or prepare perjured testimony. In Stokes v. Chi-
cago,180 the district court held that the assistant state's attorney's
attempts to induce witnesses to commit perjury, even though the "at-
tempts" allegedly involved bribery, were protected by absolute immu-
nity. 181 The court explained that preparation of witness testimony was
a function intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.
182
Besides these examples, there are many more instances of
prosecutorial misconduct that courts have construed as advocacy and
therefore absolutely immune from suit. These include: deciding
whether or not prosecute,8 3 initiating a prosecution without probable
cause,184 creating and proffering perjured testimony, 185 making and
then breaching plea bargaining agreements, 86 offering defendants re-
177. See id. at 1171-72. Spurlock was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in
prison, despite the absence of non-fabricated evidence linking him to the crime. See
id. at 1172. Five years after the conviction, the real killers confessed to the crime. See
id. at 1173. Spurlock's conviction was vacated. See id.
178. See id. at 1169.
179. See id. at 1187.
180. 660 F. Supp. 1459 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
181. See id. at 1461.
182. See id.
183. See Yin Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1993); Har-
rington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1992); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1119
(2d Cir. 1990); Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990).
184. In Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270 (6th Cir.
1998). a prosecutor arrested and indicted a woman and her boyfriend for extortion
because they were attempting to settle a sexual harassment claim against the woman's
employer. See id. at 271-73. The couple had consulted with an attorney several times
about filing a sexual harassment suit, but first attempted to settle out of court. See id.
at 272. The prosecutor decided to investigate the couple for extortion when the wo-
man's employer contacted him about the settlement attempts. See id. at 273. After a
preliminary hearing, a state court judge dismissed the extortion charges. See id. at 274.
The couple then filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the prosecutor for violations of their
Fourth Amendment rights arising from the investigation and arrest for extortion. See
id. The district court concluded there was no probable cause to arrest the couple. See
id. According to the district court, the "indicia of probable cause were so lacking"
that no reasonable official could have believed that the couple was violating Michi-
gan's extortion law. See id. The Sixth Circuit reversed and granted the prosecutor
qualified immunity for his role in the investigation and absolute immunity for his
actions in obtaining the arrest warrant and prosecuting the woman and her boyfriend.
See id. at 274-77.
185. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 344 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1989); Fullman v. Grad-
dick, 739 F.2d 553, 558 & n.2, 559 (11th Cir. 1984).
186. See Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d Cir. 1995).
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lease-dismissal agreements, 8 7 mishandling or refusing to handle an
appeal or other post trial proceedings,'8 s carrying out incomplete fac-
tual investigations necessary to prepare a case,"8 9 submitting false
statements in applications for search and arrest warrants,' 9° and con-
spiring with a judge to predetermine the outcome of a case. 91
2. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct that Receives
Qualified Immunity
Courts have found a wide range of activity by prosecutors to be
protected by qualified immunity. For instance, Hart v. O'Brien"9 pro-
vides an example of prosecutorial misconduct that involves a prosecu-
tor's investigative role.'93 In Hart, the plaintiff sued a prosecutor
under § 1983 for providing incorrect information about plaintiff's
identity for an affidavit supporting a search warrant. 9 The prosecu-
tor confused the plaintiff with the wife of a well-known drug dealer
and subsequently failed to alert arresting officers that he had mistaken
the identity of the target of the warrant.19s The prosecutor did not
intervene before plaintiff's arrest, even when he realized his mis-
take.' 96 The court awarded qualified immunity to all of the prosecu-
tor's actions and stated it could find no controlling case law that
imposed an affirmative constitutional duty on a prosecutor assisting in
a search "to inform law enforcement officers of his doubts that [a]
warrant should be executed as written."'1
Similarly, courts have awarded qualified immunity to prosecutors
who failed to take steps to protect or warn witnesses who were in
danger because of their decision to testify at trial.' 9 In Piechowicz v.
United States,199 the survivors of several murder victims, who had been
prosecution witnesses, brought actions under Bivens against an Assis-
tant United States Attorney ("AUSA")." The plaintiffs alleged that
the decedents had been threatened by a defendant against whom they
187. These agreements refer to the dropping of criminal charges in exchange for
the defendant's dismissal of related civil rights actions. See Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d
287, 290-91 (2d Cir. 1989); McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984).
188. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1995).
189. See Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1989); Mullinax v.
McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 715 (11th Cir. 1987).
190. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991).
191. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
192. 127 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 1997).
193. See id
194. See id at 434.
195. See id. at 433.
196. See id at 449-50.
197. Id at 450.
198. See Yimg Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1993);
Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1987).
199. 685 F. Supp. 486 (D. Md. 1988).
200. See id at 488-89.
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were scheduled to testify.2 °' The plaintiffs further alleged that the
AUSA, when informed about the threats, told the decedents not to
worry and to testify truthfully.2 1 Despite the fact that the AUSA
knew that the defendant had threatened to harm a prosecution wit-
ness in an earlier proceeding against him, and had subsequently
harmed that witness, the AUSA took no further action concerning the
threats or any possible danger to the witnesses.20 3 The witnesses testi-
fied at trial and were "gunned down gangland style" several weeks
later by an agent of the defendant.2 °4 The court held that the plaintiffs
failed to allege that the defendants violated any clearly established
principle of constitutional law. 05 The court dismissed the claims
against the prosecutor in his individual capacity based on qualified
immunity.0 6
Courts have granted prosecutors qualified immunity for leaking al-
legedly false and defamatory information about defendants to the me-
dia. In Aversa v. United States,20 7 an Assistant United States Attorney
was investigating Aversa for structuring bank deposits. 08 Aversa ex-
plained to the AUSA that he had acquired the money contained in the
deposits in a legitimate real estate venture and was trying to hide it
from his wife, whom he was about to divorce.209 The legitimacy of
Aversa's money was well-documented, but the AUSA implied to local
and national news media that Aversa was involved in drug dealing and
money laundering.210 The prosecutor knew these implications were
false.2 1' The statements "caused irreparable harm to Aversa's per-
sonal and business reputations, '' 212 and Aversa was socially stigma-
tized.2 13 He was discharged from his job and prevented from finding
further employment as an accountant.2 14 Aversa sued the AUSA
under Bivens based on the AUSA's public statements. 15 While the
court deplored the AUSA's press statements, which it categorized as
"false, misleading, self-serving, unjust, and unprofessional, 2 16 it could
201. See id. at 488.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 489.
205. See id. at 493.
206. See id.
207. 99 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir. 1996).
208. See id. at 1204.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1204-05.
211. See id. at 1204.
212. Id. at 1206.
213. See id. at 1205-06.
214. See id. at 1206.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 1216.
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do nothing because the AUSA was personally protected by qualified
immunity.217
The circuit and district courts have also considered the following
actions investigative and thus protected by qualified immunity: illegal
wiretapping,218 participating in illegal searches and seizures of prop-
erty,219 altering a trial transcript, directing the police to pursue in-
vestigations without regard to significant exculpatory evidence,'
participating in a search or arrest for which no probable cause ex-
ists,' 2 and withholding of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors not in-
volved with the pending appeal.'m
Broad grants of immunity leave wronged individuals without re-
dress. Thus, civil remedial schemes, such as § 1983 and Bivens actions,
are ineffective as methods of regulating prosecutors. As a result of
absolute and qualified immunities, a paucity of civil suits against pros-
ecutors reach a full trial on the merits. Thus, factual questions about a
prosecutor's alleged misconduct are never resolved, and doubts about
the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct are never publicly ad-
dressed. Imbler purported to address this shortcoming in the civil
law's treatment of prosecutors, and it reasoned that civil remedial
schemes were not needed to assist in the regulation of prosecutors
because the availability of professional discipline would adequately
punish and deter prosecutorial misconduct. Part IV discusses why Im-
bler's promise was a false one.
IV. IMBLER'S FALSE PREMISE
This part examines why Imbler's premise that professional disci-
pline adequately protects the public from prosecutorial misconduct
217. For a similar situation, see ScJrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1991).
The prosecutor initiated a forfeiture proceeding to seize property under the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. See id. at 1405. The prosecutor
seized the wrong person's business and subsequently made statements in the press
linking the person and the business to drug activities although neither the person nor
the business were ever implicated or investigated for the underlying crime. See id. at
1417 n.15. In spite of several requests by plaintiff, federal officials never issued any
retraction statements to correct the error in public. See id. Plaintiff filed a Bivens
action, but the prosecutor was protected by qualified immunity. See id. at 1420.
218. See Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1984).
219. See Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 715 (11th Cir. 1987).
220. See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1978).
221. See Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 275 (6th
Cir. 1998); Rhodes v. Smithers, 939 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (S.D.W. Va. 1995). In Rhodes,
a prosecutor advised the police to target a correctional officer in a prison contraband
investigation based on witness statements that were false and misleading, obtained by
coercion, and contrary to earlier (non-coerced) reports that exculpated the officer.
See id. at 1262-63. The court awarded the prosecutor qualified immunity for these
actions. See i. at 1264.
222. See Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 449-51 (5th Cir. 1997); Day v. Morgenthau,
909 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1990).
223. See Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 365-66 (7th Cir. 1992).
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was flawed. This part demonstrates that Imbler's premise was incor-
rect for several reasons: some prosecutorial misconduct is unconstitu-
tional but not unethical or illegal, some unconstitutional prosecutorial
behavior is unethical, but enforcement of the applicable ethics rule is
uneven and erratic, and prosecutors who engage in misconduct are
rarely subject to the criminal law.
A. Some Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Unconstitutional but Not
Unethical or Illegal
Ethics rules for prosecutors do not address much of the
prosecutorial misconduct that plaintiffs allege in civil suits against
prosecutors. The rules that pertain to lawyers generally do not con-
sider prosecutors' duties, which are different from those of other law-
yers. Ethical Consideration 7-13 states that the prosecutor's duty is to
"seek justice, not merely to convict." '24 Model Rule 3.8 and Model
Code DR 7-103 provide amorphous instructions to prosecutors based
on this do-justice mandate.99 To the extent that a prosecutor may
determine what constitutes justice with regard to her constituents, she
may rationalize almost any conduct.22 6
1. Prosecutorial Misconduct that Is Beyond the Scope of Ethics
Rules and Criminal Law
Imbler's premise depends on the assumption that the behavior for
which courts grant prosecutors immunity from civil action will be con-
sidered unethical in the rules framework. As this section demon-
strates, some of the alleged behavior of which plaintiffs complained in
the civil suits in part III is unconstitutional and actionable under
§ 1983 and Bivens, but it is neither unethical nor illegal.
Model Rule 3.8, along with state rules imposing special responsibili-
ties on prosecutors, applies to a narrow range of conduct in which only
prosecutors engage. Prosecutor-specific rules cover only a fraction of
prosecutorial actions.2 27 Ethics rules that apply to lawyers generally,
224. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981).
225. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (1998); Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility DR 7-103.
226. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 103-04 (1991) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Structuring].
227. Specifically, Model Rule 3.8 requires that a prosecutor: (1) refrain from prose-
cuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause, (2)
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of her right to
obtain counsel and has been given the opportunity to do so, (3) not seek from unrep-
resented parties a waiver of important pretrial rights, (4) make timely disclosure to
the defense of all evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, (5) refrain
from making extra-judicial statements that are likely to materially prejudice the adju-
dicative proceeding or increase public condemnation of the accused, (6) use reason-
able care to prevent prosecutorial agents from making extra-judicial statements that
are likely to materially prejudice the adjudicative proceeding or increase public con-
[Vol. 673464
CIVIL REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS
such as Model Rules 3.3 and 3.4, apply to a broader range of conduct,
but a significant portion of conduct in which prosecutor's engage is
also outside the scope of these rules.
The ethics rules and criminal law do not condemn a prosecutor who
fails to advise arresting officers that the person whom they are about
to arrest is not the target of the arrest warrant.' 2 Ethical rules do not
recognize an affirmative duty to apprise law enforcement officers of
mistakes of material facts: Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) imposes an affirma-
tive duty on lawyers to apprise the court of material facts only if a
failure to do so would assist the perpetration of a crime or fraud upon
the court or an opposing party. 29 The ethics rules and criminal law
do not contemplate a prosecutor's participation in investigations. 2"
Prosecutorial misconduct involving advising the police, or participat-
ing in a search or arrest, is not unethical under any reading of the
ethics rules.
Ethics rules do not address a prosecutor's failure to protect wit-
nesses for the prosecution who have been threatened by defend-
ants?. 3 ' Neither the ethics rules imposing special responsibilities on
prosecutors nor the ethics rules applicable to lawyers generally ad-
dress the prosecutor's duty to warn or protect witnesses who may
place themselves in danger by testifying for the prosecution.
Ethics rules do not adequately address prosecutors' false and de-
famatory statements to the media that overtly or implicitly link an
individual, who is presumed innocent, to a serious crime, such as drug
dealing, money laundering, or racketeering.23 In 1994, the ABA
amended Model Rule 3.8 to include subparagraph (g), which prohibits
prosecutors from making extra-judicial statements that "have a sub-
stantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the ac-
cused."' 3  This rule could pertain to a prosecutor's false and
defamatory statements to the press, but it has not been adopted by
demnation of the accused, and (7) subpoena a lawyer as a witness only in extreme
circumstances. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8. Not all states have
adopted all of these provisions. See Trial Conduct: Prosecutors, Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:602-05 (Apr. 30, 1997). Most state rules imposing special
responsibilities on prosecutors require that a prosecutor (1) refrain from prosecuting
a charge the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause and (2) make
timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused. See id.
228. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text; Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
229. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3.
230. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text; Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
232. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,262,276-77 (1993); Aversa v. United
States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 (1st Cir. 1996); Schrob v. Catterson 948 F.2d 1402, 1417
n.15 (3d Cir. 1991).
233. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(g).
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any jurisdiction except the District of Columbia .1 4 Thus, it is ineffec-
tive as a regulatory tool. Model Rule 3.6(d) also governs trial public-
ity. 5 It prohibits government lawyers from making extra-judicial
statements that will have a substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative matter. 3 6 Model Rule 3.6 was also amended in
1994 in response to a case in which the Supreme Court held that Ne-
vada's version of the pre-1994 version of the rule was unconstitution-
ally vague.237 Most states' versions of the trial publicity rule, however,
are based on the ABA's pre-1994 rule. Thus, in practice, ethics rules
provide no clear guidance as to when a prosecutor has said too much
about a defendant or ongoing investigation.
Furthermore, the ethics rules do not regulate a prosecutor's duty to
diligently investigate the existence of probable cause before seeking
an arrest or indictment. Model Rule 3.8 and all state ethics rules re-
quire that a prosecutor refrain from prosecuting a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause. 38 This rule,
however, does not provide guidance concerning the amount or extent
of investigation that should precede a prosecutor's conclusion that
probable cause exists. The rules and law are also silent about a prose-
cutor's post-trial obligations to re-open cases when she becomes
aware of uncontroverted evidence that the person convicted is inno-
cent of the crime.239
No universally accepted guidelines address the ethical problems
unique to the prosecutor's tripartite role as fact finder, justice seeker,
and advocate for the government.24 ° The rules provide no instructions
for balancing the pursuit of a conviction with an individual's civil
rights. Legal ethicists claim that the primary value of disciplinary
rules lies in the "guidance they provide" and "their effect in encourag-
ing lawyers to restrain their own conduct. 2 41 The generality of the
"do justice" mandate leaves the prosecutor with a concept of a role
she must play, "minister of justice," but gives no guidance as to the
interpretation of the meaning of justice or the conduct it embodies.
234. See Trial Conduct: Prosecutors, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
61:603 (Apr. 30, 1997).
235. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6.
236. See id.
237. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991).
238. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(a); Trial Conduct. Prosecu-
tors, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 61:601 (ABA/BNA) (Apr. 30, 1997).
239. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text; Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility.
240. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 925-26
(1996).
241. See Zacharias, Structuring, supra note 226, at 107.
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2. The Legal Community Has Little Incentive to Write More
Specific Professional Rules for Prosecutors
The ethics rules are not more specific for prosecutors partly because
stakeholders in the legal community have little incentive to write
them. Bar associations have no motivation to draft rules that address
specific prosecutorial functions. Ethics codes draw their strength and
legitimacy from the "perception among lawyers that [they are] about
adherence to shared moral norms that define ... the profession.",4-
Ethics rules are a shared narrative of desirable behavior; they describe
the bar's vision of itself and its role in society. 43 Prosecutors, how-
ever, claim that they are essentially unrepresented in the ABA.2'a
Rules written by bar associations that address civil rights violations by
prosecutors, therefore, would not represent the consensus of the en-
tire legal community.
Even if some parts of the legal profession found such rules to be
acceptable, more detailed prosecutorial rules could be seen as an at-
tempt by the bar to micro-manage prosecutorial function, which
would likely generate controversies similar to those surrounding the
ABA's "no contacts" and "attorney-subpoena" provisions.24 s For
nearly a decade, the DOJ has contended that federal prosecutors are
not subject to state ethics rules concerning ex parte contact wvith rep-
resented persons.24 In 1994, the DOJ issued a regulation that at-
tempted to exempt federal lawyers from states' versions of Model
Rule 4.2 or Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1).24 7 The regulation was de-
clared invalid in United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.24 For several years, the DOJ has also contended that state dis-
ciplinary rules restricting federal prosecutors' issuance of subpoenas
to attorneys about their current or former clients are preempted by
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.24 9
In addition, there is little incentive for prosecutors' offices to draft
rules that delineate specifically how prosecutors should act in both
advocacy and investigative functions. Undoubtedly, district attorneys'
and U.S. Attorneys' offices want to maintain good press and a strong
reputation in the legal community for achieving justice, but one need
242. See Bowman, supra note 20, at 768.
243. See id at 764.
244. See id. at 770.
245. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 355, 360-62 (1996).
246. See Congress Enacts Statute that Subjects Federal Prosecutors to State Laws and
Rules, 14 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 498, 502 (Oct. 28, 1998).
247. See id
248. 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998).
249. See Congress Enacts Statute that Subjects Federal Prosecutors to State Laws and
Rules supra note 246, at 502.
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look no further than the Thornburgh Memorandum250 to understand
the inherent propensity of prosecutorial agencies to protect their own.
Prosecutorial agencies possesses insight and expertise when it comes
to law enforcement needs, but they lack comparable expertise when
they evaluate the gravity of civil rights violations in the service of the
larger good, protecting the public from crime.'" Indeed,
"[p]rosecutors engaged in the competitive enterprise of gathering in-
criminating evidence cannot objectively determine how much weight
to give the respective interest of the government and the individual
and how the balance should be struck. '' 2 2
Ethics scholars have suggested that prosecutors' offices have practi-
cal reasons for maintaining vague seek-justice ethical standards. 5 3
Specific, complex, and far-reaching ethical rules that prohibited the
types of behavior that would deprive defendants of constitutional
rights may cause prosecutors to feel restrained by the rules and thus
convict at a lower rate.214 In addition, some of the actions necessary
to avoid violating ethics rules might delay trials.255 This would affect
the productivity of the office. District attorneys and United States At-
torneys are unlikely to allow their offices to appear "soft on crime"
simply to discipline prosecutors for behavior that receives immunity in
the courtroom.
B. Some Unconstitutional Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Unethical,
But Enforcement of the Applicable Ethics Rule Is Uneven
and Erratic
Imbler's premise depends on the assumption that existing profes-
sional norms will be enforced. In some situations, however, unconsti-
tutional conduct violates ethics rules, but the rules are not enforced.
This section discusses prosecutorial behavior that, if true as alleged, is
unconstitutional and prohibited by an ethics rule, but the appropriate
rule is unevenly and erratically enforced against prosecutors.
250. This, of course, refers to attempts by the DOJ to promulgate regulations for
federal prosecutors concerning contacts with unrepresented parties. The Thornburgh
memorandum refers to an internal document written by then Attorney General
Thornburgh saying that United States Attorneys and Assistant United States Attor-
neys were subject to DOJ no-contact rules only and could thus ignore any state regu-
lations on the subject as well as Model Rule 4.2. See Little, supra note 245, at 362 &
n.29.
251. See Green, Whose Rules, supra note 29, at 487.
252. See id.
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1. Examples of Ethics Rules that Apply to Prosecutorial
Misconduct, but Are Not Often Enforced
Against Prosecutors
Many civil claims against prosecutors involve clear violations of eth-
ics rules, but no enforcement of the rule follows dismissal of the civil
suit. One frequent charge in civil suits against prosecutors is that the
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. 5 6 Non-disclosure
of evidence favorable to an accused may be a due process violation.257
It is also a clear violation of Model Rule 3.8(d).5 8 The ethics rules
impose a greater duty on prosecutors than does the constitutional
Brady doctrine. 9 The ethics rules do not condition the duty of dis-
closure on request by the defense or on the significance of the evi-
dence. 260 Unlike the constitutional duty, the ethical duty is broad and
self-activating.26' The non-disclosure ethics rule, however, is rarely
enforced against prosecutors.5 2 In civil actions against prosecutors,
non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence receives absolute immunity.26
This grant of immunity, coupled with the infrequent enforcement
against prosecutors of the non-disclosure ethics rule, leaves a poten-
tially significant deprivation of constitutional rights without redress
and unregulated.
Thus, even in cases where clear ethical rules are violated, Imbler's
premise founders. For example, following Carter v. Burch,26 in which
a prosecutor received absolute immunity for failing to disclose excul-
patory evidence that would have prevented the defendant's spending
four years in jail for a crime he did not commit, the Virginia bar
brought a disciplinary action against the prosecutor for violating Vir-
ginia's version of the exculpatory evidence disclosure rule.5l The
court, however, declined to endorse the bar's findings.66 As a result,
the prosecutor was never publicly disciplined.
256. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
257. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
258. Non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence also violates Model Code provision
DR 7-103(B) and various internal procedure provisions. See Department of Justice
Manual § 9-11.233 (Supp. 1992).




262. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
264. 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1994).
265. See McNamara, supra note 101, at 1188 & n.433.
266. See id. At the time of this writing, William T. Burch remains a prosecutor in




A subparagraph of the candor rule, Model Rule 3.3(a)(4),267 pro-
hibits the presentation of false evidence to the grand jury. Similarly,
Model Rule 3.4(b), 68 which regulates fairness to opposing party and
counsel, prohibits the fabrication of evidence and the subornation of
perjury before the grand jury. It is unclear whether professional con-
duct standards require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury.26 9 Some states have interpreted their versions of
Model Rule 3.3(d)270 to apply in the grand jury context.2 71 The com-
ment to Model Rule 3.8 indicates that ex parte proceedings include
grand jury proceedings.272 There is no constitutional requirement,
however, that a prosecutor present even substantial exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury.273 Courts classify a prosecutor's actions in
front of the grand jury as a function "intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process."274 Thus, the presentation of
false evidence and the failure to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury-even if done knowingly-receive absolute immunity
against § 1983 and Bivens actions.275 Some courts, such as the Second
Circuit, have held that absolute immunity extends as far as the subor-
nation of perjury and the fabrication of evidence before the grand
jury.276
A prosecutor may, without civil liability, present false evidence, fail
to present exculpatory evidence, suborn perjury, and fabricate evi-
dence for use before the grand jury.277 All of these actions are also
unethical under Model Rule 3.3 and Model Rule 3.4.278 Prosecutors,
267. Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) states: "A lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
3.3(a)(4) (1998).
268. Model Rule 3.4(b) states: "A lawyer shall not falsify evidence, counsel or as-
sist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited
by law." Id. Rule 3.4(b).
269. See Trial Conduct: Candor to Tribunals, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) 61:301 (1997).
270. Model Rule 3.3(d) states: "In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(d).
271. See 14 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 498, 502 (Oct. 28, 1998).
272. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. 1. The DOJ Manual
advises that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. See 7
DOJ Manual § 9-11.233 (Supp. 1992).
273. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-54 (1992).
274. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,492 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 430 (1976)).
275. See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Hill v. City of New
York, 45 F.3d 653, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1995); Spurlock v. Whitley, 971 F. Supp. 1166, 1187
(M.D. Tenn. 1997).
276. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (fabricating evidence);
Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996) (suborning perjury); Hill, 45 F.3d at
662 (fabricating evidence).
277. See supra Part III.C.1.
278. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1998).
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however, are rarely subject to professional discipline for violations of
these rules. It is likely that knowledge of this fact, together with the
availability of absolute immunity for grand jury conduct, provides an
incentive for prosecutors to disregard professional norms before the
grand jury.
For example, the prosecutor's presentation of false evidence to the
grand jury in Hill v. City of New York,279 if true as alleged, is a viola-
tion of Model Rule 3.4. Model Rule 3.4 does not have an explicit
knowledge requirement, but some states have interpreted Model Rule
3.4 to include a requirement that the lawyer act knowingly. s In Hill,
the prosecutor coerced a child to implicate his mother in a child abuse
charge in two videotaped interviews."8 The child implicated his foster
brother in the first interview and his mother in the second3 s Though
the prosecutor created two videotapes, he presented only one video-
tape to the grand jury; 3 thus, he clearly knew that one was false.
According to the plaintiff's complaint, the prosecutor also knew that
the boy had implicated his foster brother in the abuse claim in a dis-
cussion with the doctor who treated his abuse-related injuries.
Thus, the prosecutor violated Model Rule 3.4, even if it includes a
knowledge requirement. There is no record of public disciplinary ac-
tion taken against the prosecutor.' The Imbler court either did not
anticipate this situation in its decision, or affirmatively excluded it
from its analysis. It is difficult to reconcile Imbler's reasoning with the
result in Hill.
Model Rule 3.3(a) prohibits a prosecutor from knowingly present-
ing false evidence at trial and conspiring to present false evidence2
The Supreme Court has held that all trial conduct is advocacy in func-
tion?' and thus protected by absolute immunity. Absolute immu-
nity insulates a prosecutor for knowingly presenting false evidence at
trial s9 and for conspiring to present false evidence at trial.29° By ap-
plying absolute immunity to trial-related misconduct, the courts have
again immunized prosecutors for behavior that is unethical but for
which prosecutors are not often subject to disciplinary review.
279. See 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995).
280. See, e.g., In re Shannon, 876 P.2d 548,560 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that because a
lawyer did not know that answers to interrogatories were false, he did not violate
Arizona Ethical Rule 3.4(b), which is analogous to Model Rule 3A(b)).




285. Search of WESTLAW, METH-CS database (Mar. 4, 1999).
286. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a) (1998).
287. That is, "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
288. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
289. See Spurlock v. Whitley, 971 F. Supp. 1166, 1187 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
290. See Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a prosecutor from making false
statements to obtain warrants. 291 Courts have granted prosecutors ab-
solute immunity from federal civil suits for submitting false statements
to judges to obtain warrants292 and testifying falsely in warrant hear-
ings.293 In a like manner, Model Rule 3.4(b)2 94 prohibits a prosecutor
from assisting or illegally inducing a witness to testify falsely. Abso-
lute immunity protects prosecutors who try to influence witness testi-
mony or prepare perjured testimony.
2. The Legal Community Has Little Incentive to Enforce Clear
Ethics Rules Against Prosecutors
There is little incentive for the stakeholders in the legal community
to discipline prosecutors for violations of clear ethics rules. Although
state disciplinary authorities frequently make lofty pronouncements
about self-policing and the requirement that their attorneys conform
to high standards of professionalism, the reality is that state authori-
ties rarely discipline prosecutors for misconduct. 95 When state au-
thorities discipline prosecutors, they do so in private.296 Thus, they
provide no public accountability that could deter future misbehavior
by prosecutors.2 97 According to a recent Chicago Tribune survey,
although 381 homicide defendants since 1963 have received new trials
because prosecutors had engaged in misconduct such as withholding
evidence or suborning perjury, no prosecutor received a public sanc-
tion by a state disciplinary authority or other agency for such misbe-
havior.298 In addition, no prosecutor was disbarred for securing a
conviction while engaging in misconduct. 99
The lack of disciplinary proceedings brought by state disciplinary
authorities may be due, in part, to the fact that the agencies never
learn of most cases in which prosecutorial misconduct has allegedly
291. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b).
292. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487 (1991); West v. City of Parsons, 983 F.
Supp. 1027, 1031 (D. Kan. 1997); cf. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997)
(awarding the prosecutor absolute immunity for preparing and filing a motion for an
arrest warrant, but only qualified immunity for swearing to the truth of the facts in a
certification that accompanied the other motion documents).
293. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 489-91; Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (3d
Cir. 1991).
294. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
295. See McNamara, supra note 101, at 1187 n.422.
296. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 88-89; Morton, supra note 45, at 1107-08.
297. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 88-89. According to Douglas J. McNa-
mara, a search of published disciplinary cases revealed 31 cases since 1958 involving
the disbarment of prosecutors. Most of the disbarments occurred after the prosecu-
tors were convicted of a crime. See McNamara, supra note 101, at 1187 n.422. Ac-
cording to McNamara, only two of the prosecutors disbarred engaged in conduct that
possibly could have been actionable under § 1983. See id.
298. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, Chi. Trib., Jan.
10, 1999, News, at 1.
299. See id.
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occurred. 00 Prosecutors do not have clients to report wrongdoing-
as would a private attorney who defrauded a civil litigant. Defense
lawyers and judges, who are the only individuals other than witnesses
and defendants likely to view prosecutorial misbehavior, rarely report
disciplinary allegations.30'
Furthermore, some state authorities rely on referrals by prosecu-
tors' offices for evidence in disciplinary proceedings. 3'  Overtly pur-
suing prosecutors to discipline themselves would ruin these
relationships. 303 Moreover, disciplinary agencies may be reluctant to
redress ethical complaints against prosecutors that are launched by
resentful defendants or political opponents.3 1
Some state authorities may be reluctant to discipline prosecutors for
misconduct because they believe that prosecutors are accountable to
the public through the political process. While most state and local
prosecutors are elected officials, and theoretically can be voted out of
office, voters do not always know about a prosecutor's misconduct. 31
Appeals courts that are reviewing a prosecutor's misconduct rarely
name prosecutors in their written opinions, even when the court finds
the prosecutor's conduct deplorable.3° Many states publish only a
small number of their appellate disciplinary opinions. 317 Furthermore,
even if voters are aware of a prosecutor's misconduct, there is no
guarantee that voters will repudiate the offending prosecutor. 308 For
example, Ray Whitley,0 9 the prosecutor in Spurlock v. Whide.)P 1 who
had allegedly encouraged witnesses to lie and presented false testi-
mony at trial, was re-elected in August 1998 to his post as chief prose-
cutor of Sumner County, Tennessee. 1
State authorities may further assume that prosecutors are ade-
quately policed through judicial mechanisms such as suppression, ex-
clusion, or dismissal.312 On the federal level, these judicial
mechanisms are known as the courts' supervisory powers.313 Because
courts are interested in conducting criminal trials within the appropri-
ate bounds of legal ethics and in ensuring an appearance of fairness,
courts reserve the power to dismiss cases and suppress evidence on
300. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 89.
301. See id.
302. See id at 90.
303. See id.
304. See Wolfram, supra note 58, § 13.10.2, at 761.




309. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
310. 971 F. Supp. 1166 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
311. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 298.
312. See Schneyer, supra note 17, at 42.
313. See Morton, supra note 45, at 1089.
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their own motion.314 Judges may also find offending prosecutors in
contempt of court. According to the Supreme Court, courts may use
their supervisory powers to implement a remedy for violation of rec-
ognized rights, to preserve judicial integrity and ensure that a convic-
tion rests on appropriate considerations, and to deter illegal
conduct.315 The scope of supervisory powers to remedy prosecutorial
misconduct has been narrowed significantly by a number of recent
Supreme Court cases. 3 16 Thus, courts may invoke their supervisory
powers only to enforce or remedy a breach of standards articulated by
Congress or the Supreme Court. The test is particularly high in the
grand jury arena. Only violations of constitutional rights and federal
statutes are proper bases for the dismissal of indictments. 317 Thus, a
judge has no power to dismiss an indictment solely because the prose-
cutor violated a state ethical rule.318 In addition, supervisory and con-
tempt powers work only when the judge discovers a prosecutor's
misbehavior during trial. They are useless in situations where a prose-
cutor's civil rights or torts violations come to light after the proceeding
is over.
Prosecutorial agencies rarely discipline prosecutors for misconduct.
For example, in the Department of Justice, OPR investigates allega-
tions of AUSA misconduct and makes recommendations for disci-
pline.319  Supervisors of offending AUSAs actually impose
sanctions. 32 0 The supervisors are not bound by OPR's determinations
and may impose any sanction they believe is appropriate or none at
all.32' Until December 1993,322 OPR conducted all of its investiga-
314. See id.
315. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
316. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992) (holding that a district
court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the government failed to
disclose to the grand jury that it possessed substantial exculpatory evidence); Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988) (holding that a federal court
may not use supervisory powers to dodge the harmless-error inquiry of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and that a district court may not dismiss an indictment
because of prosecutorial misconduct unless the misconduct was so great as to deny the
defendant a fair trial); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986) (uphold-
ing petit jury's verdict despite "any conceivable error in the charging decision that
might have flowed from [prosecutorial misconduct]"). These cases addressed the use
of supervisory powers in the grand jury context, but their effect is felt throughout the
trial process.
317. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254-55.
318. See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1987).
319. See Office of Prof'l Responsibility, Department of Justice, Fiscal Year 1996
Annual Report 1 [hereinafter DOJ, 1996 Report].
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. USDOJ Memorandum from Philip B. Heymann, Deputy Attorney General, to
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Counsel Office of Professional Responsibility 1 (Dec. 13,
1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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tions in private.323 Because OPR did not publicize its DOJ investiga-
tions, it did not provide prosecutors with a guide to appropriate
conduct.324 Today, OPR has a policy of making its findings public
when misconduct has been found or the investigated prosecutor re-
quests disclosure after being exonerated. 3 1 As of January 1999, only
seventeen reports have been released to the public.326 One such re-
port addressed the fate of the offending AUSA in Aversa v. United
States.327 After finding intolerable levels of misbehavior by the prose-
cutor,328 the court referred the case to OPR. The prosecutor's con-
duct, as alleged, violated DOJ regulations concerning "Media
Relations. '329 OPR, however, concluded that there was "no support
for the allegation that [the prosecutor] ... made inappropriate state-
ments to the press"; OPR's ultimate finding was that the prosecutor
did not engage in professional misconduct.3 0 Consequently, the
AUSA was never publicly disciplined.
323. See DOJ, 1996 Report, supra note 319, at 2.
324. See Green, Policing, supra note 26, at 85.
325. See id. at 86.
326. Telephone Interview with unnamed employee, Office of Professional Respon-
sibility (Feb. 8, 1999). In fiscal year 1996, the most recent for which data is available,
OPR opened a total of 121 matters, all of which involved allegations of misconduct by
Department Attorneys. See DOJ, 1996 Report, supra note 319, at 4. This number was
a 37% decrease from the 192 attorney related matters opened in fiscal year 1995. See
id. OPR closed a total of 144 matters in fiscal year 1996. See id. at 6. Allegations of
professional misconduct were substantiated in 15, or 11%, of the 139 attorney matters
closed. See id. The misconduct complaints received in fiscal year 1996 were quantified
and classified as follows: abuse of prosecutorial or investigative authority-34 com-
plaints; unauthorized release of information-16 complaints; conflicts of interest-15;
misrepresentation to the court-14; failure to perform duties properly, negligence-
10; failure to disclose exculpatory, impeachment, or discovery material-9; improper
oral or written remarks to the grand jury or court-6; criminality-6; unprofessional
behavior-6; improper contacts with represented parties-2; other (including unau-
thorized practice of law and violation of civil rights)-3. See id. at 5.
327. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text; see also Office of Prof'l Re-
sponsibility, Department of Justice, Summary of the Investigation by the Office of
Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of Assistant United States Attorney
Paul Kanter in United States v. Van Engel 5-6 (n.d.) (on file with the Fordhain Law
Review) (finding that the AUSA did not engage in professional misconduct although
the court stated that the "legal foundation for the government's investigation was
virtually nonexistent"); Letter from Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General,
United States Department of Justice, to the Honorable James M. Ideman, District
Court Judge, United States District Court for the District of Los Angeles 1-2 (May 2,
1994) (on file with the Fordhamn Law Review) (explaining that OPR concluded that an
AUSA had not intentionally made misrepresentations to the district court, although
the district court had referred the case to OPR because the AUSA should have
turned prior inconsistent testimony over to the defense).
329. See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996).
330. Office of Prof'l Responsibility, Department of Justice, Summary of the Investi-
gation by the Office of Prof'l Responsibility into the Conduct of Assistant United
States Attorney Patrick M. Walsh and Former United States Attorney Jeffrey R.
Howard in United States v. Aversa 6 (1997).
1999] 3475
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
That prosecutors may on some occasions put convictions ahead of
justice, and therefore lack incentive to regulate themselves, is further
evident in some prosecutors' disregard of Batson v. Kentucky.331 In
Batson, the Supreme Court held that when prosecutors exercise per-
emptory challenges based on race, they violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Judges give prosecutors
wide deference when enforcing Batson; prosecutors are thus left to
regulate themselves. Despite the clarity of Batson's holding, prosecu-
tors attempt to circumvent it by lying to judges and fabricating non-
racial pretexts for race-based peremptory challenges.333 Some district
attorneys' offices have conducted training sessions on how to avoid
Batson challenges and to encourage the use of race as a reason for
peremptory challenges.334
C. Criminal Enforcement of Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Rare
Even when a prosecutor's misconduct is arguably a criminal act
such as suborning perjury or obstructing justice, enforcement against
prosecutors is rare. The Chicago Tribune examination of homicide
cases over the past thirty-six years uncovered 381 homicide convic-
tions nationwide that have been reversed because prosecutors en-
gaged in misconduct such as using false evidence or withholding
exculpatory evidence.335 Not a single prosecutor in those cases, how-
ever, was ever brought to trial for the misconduct. 336 According to the
Tribune, only two of those cases resulted in charges being filed and in
both instances, the charges were dismissed before trial.337 The Trib-
une search found only six prosecutors in this century who have faced
criminal charges alleging concealment of evidence or using false
evidence.338
In the balance of civil regulation of prosecutors and prosecutorial
function, the Supreme Court has heretofore sided with prosecutorial
function. Some entity, therefore, must ensure that prosecutors are not
331. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
332. See id. at 84.
333. See Abbe Smith, "Nice Work If You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 523, 543 n.90 (1998).
334. See, e.g., Michael Matza, Jury's Out on Whether Ethics Were Violated, Phila.
Inquirer, Apr. 2, 1997, at 33 (detailing the disclosure of a controversial decade-old
training videotape, which was full of racial stereotyping and race-based strategies for
picking juries, created by a former Philadelphia prosecutor).
335. See Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial in Du Page, Chi.
Trib., Jan. 12, 1999, News, at 1.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See id. One of the prosecutors who faced criminal charges was Patrick
Brophy, who had conspired with sheriffs officials to hide evidence and persuaded
witnesses to lie against organized crime figures. See id. Brophy was convicted of a
single misdemeanor count for eliciting perjury and suppressing evidence and was
fined $500. See id.
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violating their mandate to do justice by using unjust means. While the
Court may invoke the preservation of justice overall as the reason for
favoring prosecutorial function over the civil regulation of prosecutors
and the vindication of one plaintiff's civil rights, the numerous civil
rights violations facilitated by the availability of broad immunity for
prosecutors undermines the very notion of justice the Court purports
to protect. Though most prosecutors act in good faith, broad grants of
immunity give some prosecutors too much license to violate civil
rights. The violation of even one individual's civil rights is contrary to
the concept of justice. Some entity in the legal community, therefore,
must reinforce the concept that it is not just for prosecutors to violate
constitutional and civil rights in the pursuit of convictions at all costs.
The legal community must not seek to saddle prosecutors with moun-
tains of civil liability and restrictions, but must stop violations of con-
stitutional rights before they occur. Part V offers several methods to
approach these problems.
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE: RECOMMENDATIONS TO FILL THE VOID
This part proposes several ways to fill the void created by broad
grants of immunity for alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the
dearth of regulatory follow-up. Possible solutions include: (1) a dis-
trict court reporting mechanism that causes prima facie civil rights vio-
lations by prosecutors to trigger parallel disciplinary investigation by
state disciplinary authorities, (2) greater rule specificity for prosecu-
tors, and (3) the shift in the level of immunity granted to prosecutors
from absolute immunity for advocacy functions and qualified immu-
nity for investigative functions to qualified immunity, regardless of
function.
A. Reporting Procedures and Parallel Disciplinary Review
District courts should develop a reporting mechanism that causes
prima facie violations of § 1983 and Bivens to trigger parallel discipli-
nary investigations by state disciplinary authorities. One interpreta-
tion of Imbler suggests that district courts may be obligated to report
prosecutorial wrongdoing to state disciplinary agencies and that those
agencies are obligated to initiate proceedings against errant
prosecutors.339
State disciplinary authorities are the best entity to conduct investi-
gations of prosecutorial misconduct because state bodies have an in-
terest in maintaining the integrity of the practice of law within the
state's borders, regardless of whether the prosecutors are admitted to
practice there. Prosecutors' offices would seem to know best what
339. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
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prosecutors do, but they may be inherently too biased to ensure fair
disciplinary review. 34 °
While a reporting mechanism and parallel review would address
prosecutorial misconduct that violates existing disciplinary rules, it
would not take care of behaviors for which there are no rules exactly
on point. Therefore, more specific rules for prosecutors are also nec-
essary to deter prosecutorial misconduct.
B. Specific Ethical Rules for Prosecutors
The American Bar Association should collaborate with the judici-
ary, the Department of Justice, and local prosecutors' offices to draft
more specific 341 ethical rules for prosecutors that include explicit
guidelines for the types of behavior most often engaged in by prosecu-
tors. The rules should consider the expanding role of the prosecutor
in investigations, as well her more traditional identity as advocate and
minister of justice. The rules should address tortious conduct and civil
rights violations.342 They should detail the parameters of acceptable
behavior for prosecutors during trial, during investigations, question-
ing witnesses, obtaining warrants, presenting evidence, and addressing
the grand jury. Ethical rules for prosecutors must also explicitly pro-
hibit, in pertinent part, the fabrication of evidence, the knowing pres-
entation of false evidence at trial, and the knowing presentation of
false evidence to a grand jury.
Prosecutors are lawyers, but unlike other lawyers, they are not just
advocates.343 As advocates for the government, prosecutors are en-
dowed with great power.344 With this great power comes the great
responsibility of doing justice. Opponents of rule specificity claim that
specific, narrowly tailored rules would hinder the prosecutor's pursuit
of justice by giving her just another set of regulations to worry
about.345 On the contrary, detailed rules that explain what is and is
not acceptable behavior would enhance the prosecutor's role as jus-
tice-seeker by giving well-meaning prosecutors a barometer of what
340. See supra notes 318-33 and accompanying text.
341. The term "specific" in this Note refers to specificity in the scope of conduct the
rule covers and particularity of the acts the rule prohibits. See Fred C. Zacharias,
Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223, 239-40 (1993) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Specificity].
342. A disciplinary rule could mirror § 1983 and Bivens. Perhaps prima facie viola-
tions of 1983 and Bivens (i.e., where, if it were not for immunity awarded prosecutors,
plaintiffs would be entitled to relief) should act as a red flag that triggers a parallel
disciplinary review. The mechanics of this must be flushed out. There is no guarantee
that a new rule or rules would be any more effective in addressing ethics violations by
prosecutors than the present rule system, but at least stakeholders in the legal com-
munity would publicly address the impropriety of prosecutors' civil rights violations.
343. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
345. See Bowman, supra note 20, at 770-80.
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should and should not be done.346 Specific ethical rules would remind
prosecutors that discretion does not give them a free pass to violate
the tenets of the Constitution or to commit tortious acts. More spe-
cific rules for prosecutors would give prosecutors what the Model
Code and Model Rules have given lawyers generally-guidance in
choosing from among several permissible courses of conduct. 3 7
Specific rules for prosecutors are especially necessary considering
the court's insulation of prosecutors from civil liability. Twenty-three
years of civil cases after Imbler suggest that prosecutors need gui-
dance that balances respect for civil rights with the pursuit of convic-
tions. Indeed, insulation from civil liability creates a natural incentive
for prosecutors to take the unethical path when convictions are on the
line. as
The task of drafting specific rules of ethics for prosecutors must be a
collaborative effort involving the ABA, state and federal courts, and
state and federal prosecutors' offices. A unilateral creation of rules
would result in the rules being ignored or viewed as suspect by the
non-rule-drafting stakeholders. This would lead to unproductive con-
troversies such as those surrounding the "no contacts" 9 and "attor-
ney subpoena" 350 provisions of the Model Rules.
C. Qualified Immunity Only
To further address prosecutorial misconduct, the Supreme Court
should reduce the immunity available to prosecutors as a defense to
§ 1983 and Bivens claims. Some immunity is clearly necessary to pro-
tect prosecutors from the frivolous suits of disgruntled defendants, but
the Supreme Court has significantly enlarged the prosecutorial immu-
nity available at common law. What was once mere absolute immu-
nity against malicious prosecution and defamation has snowballed
into absolute immunity for all actions "intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process ' 351 and qualified immunity for
all investigative and administrative functions. The Supreme Court's
functional test causes lower courts to label prosecutors' actions incon-
sistently because the existence of probable cause is often difficult to
discern from the record. Standard grants of qualified immunity for all
346. See Flowers, supra note 240, at 964.
347. See Zacharias, Specificity, supra note 341, at 241.
348. See id. at 284.
349. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (1998).
350. See id Rule 3.8(f).
351. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). See generally' Thomas J. Foltz,
Prosecutorial Immunity No Longer Absolutae: A Shaky Bridge over Troubled Water, 8
Crim. Just., Winter 1994, at 21 (discussing the types of immunity the Supreme Court
has awarded to prosecutors in various circumstances).
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prosecutorial functions would save the courts from having to spend
time labeling prosecutorial functions." 2
Qualified immunity is sufficient to protect the integrity of the judi-
cial process. Qualified immunity would continue to protect the well-
intentioned prosecutor from liability, but would hold liable those who
willfully violate federal statutory or constitutional rights. 3  Further-
more, the default preference of the Court is for qualified immunity.354
CONCLUSION
To address the deficiencies in Imbler's premise, the legal community
can respond in one of two overarching ways: it can truncate the im-
munity awarded to prosecutors, or it can revise the regulatory process
as it pertains to prosecutors. Because the Supreme Court seems
firmly wedded to its tradition of granting prosecutors broad immunity
from civil suit, the most prudent response in the short term is the revi-
sion of the regulatory process as it pertains to prosecutors. This
should include the development of reporting procedures in district
courts, which would trigger parallel disciplinary review, and greater
rule specificity for prosecutors. Regardless of what is done, the means
must be a collaborative effort and the end must be not to saddle pros-
ecutors with mountains of civil liability, but to provide prosecutors
with a barometer of acceptable behavior. The message must be this:
certain behaviors, such as fabricating evidence, failing to disclose ex-
culpatory evidence, and lying to obtain warrants-even if used in pur-
suit of a worthy justice-seeking goal-are in themselves contrary to
the concept of justice and thus antithetical to the prosecutor's mis-
sion-to pursue justice, not merely to convict.
352. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. One person writing on the
subject of prosecutorial immunity has suggested that the Supreme Court should main-
tain a narrow definition of a prosecutor's advocate role to avoid frustrating the pur-
pose of § 1983 claims. See Anthony Meier, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Can § 1983
Provide an Effective Deterrent to Prosecutorial Misconduct?, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 1167,
1169 (1998). This solution, however, does not avoid the problem of determining
which function applies in the way abolishing absolute immunity for prosecutors alto-
gether would.
353. See supra notes 103-22 and accompanying text.
354. See id.
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